THE RESULTS OF DEREGULATION
There have been many analyses of the results of deregulation. The vast majority of them point to the dramatic growth of the airline industry since 1978 as one of the primary outcomes of deregulation. Table 2 indicates 45.9% growth in total airline employment during the same period. Note. From Air Transport Association.
In the ten year period of 1978-1988, the airline industry has gone through distinct phases, according to the FAA: 3. Concentration (four largest carriers accounted for 60.4% of traffic in whereby the two carriers would begin code-sharing operations in the Seattle-Chicago-London and Denver-Chicago-London markets (FAA, 1989) .
Since 1987, many other international airline marketing and ownership combinations have been either proposed or consummated. These include marketing agreements between Texas Air/SAS, British Airways/United, Singapore Air/Delta and ownership ties between American West/AnsettAustralia, Hawaiian/Japan Air, Northwest/KLM (proposed), United/British Airways (proposed), etc. (FAA, 1989) . This active international phase of deregulation has significant implications for the airports involved in serving these airlines, both in the U.S. and in other nations.
IMPACTS OF DEREGULATION ON U.S. AIRPORTS
The impacts of deregulation on U.S. airports essentially mirror the general impacts of deregulation. That is, during each of the phases of deregulation mentioned earlier, there have been impacts on U.S. airports.
Impacts on Airports During the Expansion Phase (1978·1985)
In this phase, there were significant additions of new airlines into the domestic U.S. markets. These new airlines in turn needed gate space, counter space, and ramp space to operate at key airport terminals throughout the United States (NewMyer, 1984) . In addition, already existing airlines were feeling the benefits of route freedom under deregulation and were attempting to add as many new routes as possible to their systems. The result of this lIone-two li punch was extreme pressure to expand key airport terminals in the early years of deregulation. While a boon to many airports' long-term expansion plans, deregulation was a short-term disaster in terms of terminal congestion problems.
Another key airport impact of this early phase resulted from the move by most major and national airlines (former trunk and local service airlines) to individually adopt a hub and spoke strategy. This strategy was adopted as both a competitive, marketplace response to competition and an economic response to deregulation. That is, hubs and spokes allowed the airlines to feed themselves rather than the competition. The idea of the hub airport is for an airline to bring banks of flights into a single hub airport three or four times a day, interchange passengers during a limited layover period, and then depart these flights back out along the spokes. A list of key airline hubs is provided in Table 4 . It is important to note that there are both advantages and disadvantages of being an airline hub airport. Among the advantages are good levels of air service, high levels of airline-related employment, excellent economic impacts on the local area, etc. Among the disadvantages are the potential for higher noise levels around the airport due to greater airline service frequencies, the pressure of dealing with one or two dominant airline tenants (at the expense of new entrants which may wish to obtain gate space at the hub airport), and exacerbated peaks and valleys in runway and terminal use because of the hub bank scheduling of the airlines. What happens to an airport's traffic when a hub is started at an airport is illustrated in Table 5 . Another impact of this expansion period, and the resulting use of hub and spoke strategies by the larger airlines, was the increasing need to focus regional and commuter airline service on feeding these hubs. By the mid 1980s. 29 of the 30 top regional airlines had some sort of marketing or ownership agreement with an airline operating a hub and spoke operation.
This tended to focus air service to and from small community airports on those regional airlines with such agreements. If an airport was not served by an airline with such an agreement, the airport might lose airline service. While the Essential Air Service program was created under the Airline Deregulation
Act of 1978 to avoid such small community air service losses (Brenner. Leet & Schott. 1985) , the program did not always work. As a result, some airports lost air service. Others lost large airplane service because the Essential~ir Service program was designed to subsidize small aircraft. rather than large aircraft, service. Therefore, an important impact of deregulation in rural, small community airports was changes in the nature of, or outright loss of, air service. And, even if service was not lost, the destabilizing influence of frequent airline name changes. aircraft size changes, and/or service interruptions had negative impacts.
Impacts on Airports During the Consolidation and Concentration Phases (1986) (1987) (1988) These two phases are combined because of their sequential relationship.
That is, airline concentration in the marketplace (including at airports) is a direct result of the consolidation, or merger, of airlines. Also, these phases occurred in a very short time with quick results. Table 6 reports the larger airline mergers of 1986-1988. As can be seen, every major airline was affected by the airline merger movement of the mid-1980s. In addition to these large airline mergers, many smaller regional airlines were either merging among themselves or being bought by larger airline companies in the same period. The result has been a reduction in the number of operating airline companies in the U.S.
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Consequently, airports now have fewer airline companies to deal with.
Therefore, some airports' terminal-use agreement bargaining position is quite difficult because only one or two airlines are interested in long-term gate agreements at each individual airport. Also, the passenger business of some hub cities has become concentrated around only one or two airlines. Table 7 summarizes some of the percentage concentrations of business at selected airports which were affected by mergers. Braniff declared bankruptcy and stopped all operations, leaving Kansas City without a major hub operator for the second time in a little over a year. With three large passenger terminal buildings in operation, the result is financially disruptive to the airport operation at Kansas City. Another, less direct, impact on airports is resulting from marketing and/or ownership arrangements between U.S. domestic and international airlines. Selected combinations of airlines are summarized in Table 8 . The results of such agreements are greater volumes of international passengers on the domestic U.S. airline route systems, and domestic U.S.
airports must respond with improved services for such passengers. The deregulation of the U.S. airline industry has therefore had the following impacts on airport/airline relationships in the U.S.:
1. Airport requirements of airlines change with traffic demand, airline strategy, economic conditions, and competition.
2. Before U.S. deregulation, change was a slow process because the CAB took such a long time to approve route changes. Now, the airlines can change domestic route structures as fast as they want, but airports must be more flexible.
3. Airports and airlines formalize their relationship through airport use agreements--with terms as much as 25 years long in older agreements. Now, with deregulation and its rapid changes, both carriers and airports want shorter agreements to better adapt to change.
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3. Airlines are chosen instruments of public policy rather than as just a means of transport.
4.
Concern is growing that free competition may not be feasible in all world markets.
5. The international system as a whole lacks many of the features the U.S. system had before deregulation (there is no one, oppressive regulatory body--there are 150!).
6. U.S. deregulation efficiencies are difficult to replicate on an international basis.
Therefore, lATA concluded:
1. Deregulation is entrenched in the U.S., but re-regulation is being discussed.
2. U.S.-style deregulation has some problems as already noted.
3. There are other possibilities of liberalization of economic regulation besides U.S.-style deregulation that might affect international aviation (lATA, 1983 ).
The result is that there will be three kinds of deregulation or liberalization for airport managers to watch for in all parts of the world: The added specter of globalization of the world's airlines adds fuel to the fire. Globalization is currently taking the path of shared operations, marketing agreements, or even partial ownerships of other nations' carriers.
Eventually, large multi-national airlines may evolve. All of these evolutions mean that airport managers at international airports in all nations must be prepared for a new, competitive atmosphere in international aviation. Airports themselves can be no less competitive than the airlines serving them.
Furthermore, they must be prepared for a new global airline picture which will dramatically change the airport-airline relationships as we know them today. 
